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part i
Introduction

1 Making the political
How can our shared, humanly created environment be effectively
transformed – to make it better, less confining, more tractable to our
control? Is it even possible to change, in a spontaneous and non-
coerced way, the social and political world we inhabit? If we are
unwilling to accept coercive impositions by the state or the pow-
ers that be, it seems that only public or collective action has such
a capacity. After all, when we as individuals act for social change,
we usually do so within the parameters of an already existing set of
institutional arrangements, histories, and social understandings, cre-
ated and animated largely through the work of others. Innovation is
an extension of these socially constituted practices, whose contradic-
tions, gaps, or inadequacies engender change yet persist in constraining
it. Hanna Pitkin echoes the beliefs of many when she notes that “for
most of us . . . private, isolated acts will make little difference” for pub-
lic life unless taken in concert with others.1 Such intuitions find their
most prominent institutionalization in democratic regimes, which for
both normative and practical reasons facilitate collective as opposed
to bureaucratic, dictatorial, or unilateral action. Participatory acts in
public arenas – such as voting, collective protest, the exercise of and
respect for free expression – coordinate a plurality of individual actions
and authorize collective interventions in shared space.
But how, then, do new political movements get off the ground, from
the ground? Can ordinary individuals act for change, even if no one
has enough already in common to make those actions effective or legit-
imate? These are not simply academic considerations. Knowing what
role individuals can play in collective transformation is crucial for those
many instances where collective action is simply not forthcoming, or
where social movements have not yet materialized. In many ways, this
dilemma is reducible to that of political founding, which asks how we
1 Pitkin, “Justice,” 344.
3
4 Making the Political
can take specifically political action if no political community has yet
emerged – indeed, if no “we” yet exists even to wonder about the
question. Both cases seem to require the intervention of an innovator,
a founding father (or mother) who can call into being the community
that underwrites political actions as much as political regimes. Yet
these interventions are paradoxical – because “those who get together
to constitute a new government are themselves unconstitutional.”2 The
entire community must somehow authorize its own being before any
individual or small group of individuals can act upon, through, or in
it – even as it is surely the community and its practices that make
available all spaces for meaningful action.
Legitimacy is not the only paradox here, however. Consider those
cases where the very communities that foster and make possible nec-
essary political practices may be eroding, or where those persons
inscribed as “citizens” in the law nevertheless lack the social practices,
mutual recognition, and vocabulary that make “citizenship” mean-
ingful. If democracy or liberalism or any other regime is simply not
working – what then? Is top-down imposition the only alternative?
This more difficult question of social change was faced by several
generations of reformers in China around the turn of the twentieth
century. For these radical thinkers, democracy and other forms of
“Western” government held the promise of modernizing the imperial
state, enlivening its masses, and making those in power accountable to
those they governed – but fulfilling such a promise required that they
succeed in building a new kind of regime with no precedent in Chinese
history. China at that time was still a monarchy, ruled from the center
by the emperor and his legions of trained bureaucrats. The emperor
certainly enjoyed the putative authority to impose his sovereign will
on the Chinese people, but to the surprise of many reformers, imperial
command was not enough to make these Western institutions work.
A republican convention and the nominal establishment of a consti-
tutional order after the emperor was deposed in 1911 were equally
ineffective, even as China grew weak in the face of foreign incursion,
domestic unrest, and national debt.
At this time of unprecedented crisis, one influential thinker by the
name of Zhang Shizhao (1881–1973) explored the possibility that indi-
vidual action may be capable of bringing about a democratic regime
2 Arendt, On Revolution, 176.
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where one does not exist, and has never existed. He does not do so,
however, by presuming that individuals are somehow ontologically
prior to their political communities, that they can mimic benevolent
dictators and force their view on others, or that they can act in an
autonomous and unencumbered way. Instead, he reinterprets the sites
and actions of political founding (li guo). For Zhang, founding does
not mean the imposition of a sovereign will on an abject people, but
the gradual reorientation of personal practices and outlooks toward
unprecedented, society-wide ways of living and governing. This refor-
mulation throws light not only on founding acts, but on all acts of
everyday innovation that require, even as they call into being, an entire
community to ensure their eventual execution. Theorizing within a tra-
dition and to an audience that did not produce democratic practices
like those in contemporary Britain and America, Zhang’s task extends
beyond simply identifying how a people (min) can call into being its
government (zheng).3 Zhang also tries to explain how the individual
self (ji or wo) can perform both the constituting of the people and the
constituting of the government – indeed, must perform it, given the
absence of widespread agreement and of shared democratic norms.
Zhang’s efforts do not deny the efficacy and importance of collective
action; they simply draw attention to the steps that take place before
individual visions of change may culminate in collective support –
whether as a means of invigorating public space, changing shared envi-
ronments, or building institutions where none existed before. In other
words, these steps do not assume but actually “make the political”
(wei zheng), as Zhang phrases it,4 under conditions that are deeply
fragmented and (to many of Zhang’s readers) completely hopeless. He
must explain to his dispirited contemporaries how the action of indi-
viduals can be effective in founding a new self-ruling regime – despite
the fact that no obvious community existed in China at that time to
underwrite the novel Western practice of democratic citizenship.
In the mature democracies of northern Europe and North Amer-
ica, such problems are rarely discussed as theoretical issues because so
many of the necessary institutions and shared practices of democracy
3 This is the definition of constitutional founding offered by Arendt, On
Revolution, 145.
4 See Appendix A for detailed discussions of how I translate this and other key
terms in Zhang’s work.
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are already there. They have existed, in Edmund Burke’s words, since
“time out of mind.” Nothing as dramatic as founding is necessary,
because peaceful, incremental changes spring satisfactorily enough
from already existing or historically accessible practices and institu-
tions. In these societies, it is easy to see political innovations as cir-
cular, as many recent political theorists have: regimes inflect the very
citizens that create them, novel actions interpellate the very actors that
initiate them.5 The same cannot be said, however, for many other
parts of the world – including former European colonies whose people
often express a desire for democracy, but whose governments remain
unable or unwilling to implement it. Indeed, I would argue the same
cannot be said for any instance of innovation under conditions of
fragmentation, social opposition, or even widespread disbelief in its
possibility. Zhang’s work, then, offers a rare look at the not-so-rare
problem of how we as individuals innovate politically, before a criti-
cal mass of persons has coalesced around a shared goal or developed
awareness of themselves as a community capable of taking action. In
the process of explaining what such innovation entails and what it can
and cannot assume, Zhang’s work highlights important blindnesses in
many accounts of political agency offered both by his peers and by
contemporary political theorists. More importantly, he also offers a
constructive path forward for political action that aims for the not-yet
without being unduly constrained by the already existing. He suggests
ways for individuals to act politically, before the political domains that
foster such actions are conceptually present in the minds of those who
constitute them.
Thinking from the early Republic: some methodological
considerations on “comparative political theory”
Zhang put forward this vision for diffuse and incremental change at a
time when Chinese politics was growing increasingly and intractably
radical. In his influential political journal The Tiger (Jiayin zazhi),
Zhang drew on his exceptional conversance with both British political
theory and the Chinese intellectual tradition to defend China’s nascent
republican order. More importantly, he produced novel explanations
5 See, e.g., Honig, “Between Decision and Deliberation”; Olson, “Paradoxes”;
Frank, Democracy of Distinction.
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for the theoretical and personal, as well as political, advancements
required for a functional self-ruling polity. Yet Zhang’s ideological
dissonance with contemporary and later twentieth-century Chinese
politics has made him difficult to fit into any teleology for modern
Chinese intellectual history, which often focuses on explaining the rise
of revolutionary communism and ignores “failed” attempts to advance
moderate reform. Perhaps for this reason, much post-1949 secondary
literature on modern China has neglected Zhang – yet this marked
absence is belied by his central presence in earlier accounts of political
thought and history.6
Revised projections of China’s historical path are lending Zhang’s
thought new relevance, however. As “socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics” replaces Maoist visions of ongoing revolution, the reform
movements of the late Qing and early Republican periods (dating
roughly from the mid-nineteenth century to 1919) – once seen as dis-
tracting way stations on China’s march to communism – are now seen
to share significant continuities with the dilemmas of the present.7
With this rethinking of history has come a new valuation of the role
played by moderate reformers such as Zhang in China’s moderniza-
tion process.8 His calls for moderate constitutionalism, his obvious
importance in influencing early twentieth-century political debate, and
his skillful blending of Western and Chinese political theories has
recently enjoyed a considerable revival among Sinophone scholars,
especially since the publication of his ten-volume Collected Works
(Zhang Shizhao quanji) in the year 2000.9
This book, the first extended study of Zhang Shizhao in anyWestern
language, continues this ongoing reflection on Zhang’s importance by
demonstrating the relevance of his thought to both modern and con-
temporary debates on democracy and political action. It might seem
odd to dedicate an entire book to the work of someone so unfamil-
iar to Anglophone audiences, but there are multiple good reasons for
6 Chang Naide, for example, devotes almost an entire chapter of his less than
two-hundred page comprehensive overview of the entire history of Chinese
thought, Zhongguo sixiang xiao shi, to Zhang Shizhao and The Tiger. See the
next chapter for more discussion of Zhang’s life and influence.
7 Wang, “Zonglun”; Karl and Zarrow, Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period.
8 E.g., Huang, Yi ge bei fangqi de xuanze; Gao, Tiaoshi de zhihui, 2–6.
9 Bai, Zhang Shizhao zhuan; Guo, Kuanrong yu tuoxie; Zou, Zhang Shizhao
shehui zhengzhi sixiang.
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doing so besides Zhang’s obvious influence on past and contemporary
Chinese thought. Most centrally, Zhang’s work is fundamentally con-
cerned with articulating and answering fundamental questions about
the nature of political life, and thus with making defensible claims that
concern – in addition to the carefully argued specifics of his reform
program – the causal mechanisms of social change and the relation of
those mechanisms to the kind of politics he advocated. This means that
he is a political theorist whose work offers insight into dilemmas com-
mon to a wide variety of societies – not only those struggling to estab-
lish permanent liberal-democratic institutions, such as in Thailand and
East Timor, but also those in the contemporary West who have forgot-
ten the challenges of this process.10 His outstanding conversance with
multiple thought traditions, including classical and imperial Chinese
philosophy as well as British and European thought, equips him to
undertake this challenge with insight and sensitivity. Indeed, given the
current focus of political and social theory on transcultural learning in
an age of globalization, Zhang’s work offers unusually rich theoretical
resources for negotiating this terrain.
For these reasons, the point of this book is not really to compare
Zhang’s work with that of particular Western thinkers, so much as to
explore and assess the questions Zhang and his interlocutors articulate.
I do this by tying these questions to ongoing, sometimes millennia-old
Chinese debates, such as those concerning the role of institutions in
political transformation, as well as to past and present Euro-American
discussions that interrogate or amplify Zhang’s conclusions, such as
recent discussions about the implications for democratic politics of
founding and innovation. Acutely sensitive to Roxanne Euben’s insight
that all theory is grounded in some form of comparison, however, I
acknowledge those implicit comparisons on which any translator of
languages and ideas must draw in order to render her words and argu-
ments meaningful. My own representation of Zhang’s arguments in
English, I realize, are part of what “constitute[s] the very conditions
of intelligibility across difference.”11 This process of translation is at
the same time a process of interpellation and transformation, leading
10 On the paradoxes of constitutional founding in Southeast Asian states
that cannot presuppose liberal-democratic institutions, see Ramraj,
“The Emergency Powers Paradox.”
11 Euben, Journeys, 16.
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many comparative political theorists to characterize it as a “conversa-
tion” or “dialogue” in which differently situated interlocutors address
each others as equals rather than as radical “others.”12
Despite this obvious debt to comparative method, here and in other
work I resist the construction of a “comparative” political theory. My
resistance stems mainly from the tendency of comparison to preclude
the development (if not the examination) of arguments and viewpoints
from outside those texts and debates that have marked Euro-American
discourse in political theory for the past century. Comparison tends
to draw attention only to those aspects of other thought traditions
that exhibit obvious resonance with Western categories, rendering
non-Western ideas, thinkers, and traditions interesting as case stud-
ies but not themselves the domain of theorizing. The problem that
troubles me here is not the often-noted one in which the construction
of markers of difference and sameness enables a culturally imperialis-
tic project. Much of comparative political theory takes such an insight
to be a starting point, and its practitioners have already elaborated
quite sophisticated theoretical models to ward off or avoid such a pos-
sibility. I am more concerned that the acknowledgment of inevitable
cultural embeddedness – encouraged in the wake of Orientalist agen-
das that seek to exploit rather than understand the cultural “Other” –
authorizes attempts at cross-cultural borrowing much less radical than
they can be. Postcolonial scholars and the comparative political theo-
rists influenced by them presentWestern traditions as inevitable aspects
of all theorizing, in the process suppressing or ignoring the indigenous
traditions of inquiry that have motivated political thinking in diverse
places and times.13 The presumption is that although we can, through
whatever model of interaction, come to understand insiders’ points
of view, those of us situated on the “outside” are unable to let the
foundational premises of “insiders” fully persuade us. The best we can
do is recognize that and how particular arguments make sense for the
insiders making them, or perhaps work toward a dialogically mediated
perspective in which the mutually intelligible insights of both sides are
combined. In no case can these so-called insider perspectives ever serve
12 E.g., Euben, Enemy in the Mirror; Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism.
13 E.g., Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe; Euben, Enemy in the Mirror. I
discuss this critique in more detail in Jenco, “What Does Heaven Ever Say?”
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as building blocks for a political theory along lines that draw more
from “them” than from “us.”
Yet if we in American and European academic settings wish to make
our thinking about politics less Eurocentric and more capable of com-
prehending the variety of political experiences across the globe, simply
recognizing each other as equals offers few constructive guidelines;
staging a unilaterally initiated “conversation” between two situated
interlocutors only reinforces the very boundaries that cross-cultural
research has the potential to broach so fruitfully. It seems to me that
the best way to affirm the global diffusion of political theorizing is
to act upon it: to develop from alternative traditions and in alterna-
tive modes new possibilities for thinking critically about politics. That
way, we do not see political theory as an activity that coheres on the
basis of “shared dilemmas and questions”14 – which, not surprisingly,
are usually identified as those that are already articulated within the
“Western canon” – but as an enterprise designed to acquire new con-
ceptual and practical resources which can themselves prompt entirely
unanticipated questions and answers. Keeping the focus on Zhang and
his interlocutors, then, helps me bring to light certain contemporary
Chinese debates that hold meaning for broader audiences, rather than
returning always to parochial Western ones.
My attempt somewhat resembles the application to political the-
ory of what historian Alexander Woodside calls “appropriating Occi-
dentialism,” which encourages West-based historians to examine
Western history self-reflexively through the eyes of non-Westerners,
rather than only the other way around. Yet evenWoodside’s call simply
asks us to render the practice of history “appropriate to the study of the
huge storehouse of Chinese historical experiences,”15 much as Euben
suggests that we “introduce non-Western perspectives into familiar
debates about living together.”16 The goal for both remains merely to
craft a theory adequate to address a wider set of evidence. In contrast,
my method hopes to view and select evidence through the lens of a dif-
ferent theory, and from there rethink the project at hand in a variety
of new settings.
14 Euben, Enemy in the Mirror, 10; see also Salkever and Nylan, “Comparative
Political Philosophy.”
15 Woodside, “Reconciling the Chinese and Western Theory Worlds,” 121.
16 Euben, Enemy in the Mirror, 9.
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Obviously, any reader brings her own prejudices to the texts she
analyzes, and my reading of Zhang’s work is undoubtedly influenced
by personal experience. But claiming that such prejudices inhibit a suc-
cessful reconstruction of the arguments Zhang put forward is to court
a strange double standard about the capacity of political theorists to
learn anything from the texts they study. That is, the ability of political
theorists to draw out compelling arguments from historically situated
canonical texts remains – pace Quentin Skinner – a contested but often
utilized conclusion of the subfield. That Zhang is Chinese and I am not
has little to do with my own ability to extract from his work sophisti-
cated theoretical arguments, given adequate grounding in the language
and discourse of that time and place.17 It may be possible to formulate
an argument that cultural versus historical differences demand alter-
native modes of engagement, but until that time I will press forward
on the assumption that, given proper training, the political thinking of
early Republican China is as accessible to me as is that of any other
time and place, whether ancient Athens or Florentine Italy.
In any case, the interpretive insights to be gained by reading Zhang
as an agent of theory and not simply of history are considerable enough
to broach such risks. While historians have exhaustively documented
the intellectual debates of the Republican era, they rarely consider the
simple fact that these thinkers were, in Chang Hao’s words, “speaking
both to the historical and to the existential situations.”18 Seeing them
only as historical actors cannot adequately comprehend the nature of
persistent dilemmas that confronted them on the level of theory. In
fact, taking Zhang seriously as a theoretical, and not merely historical,
agent allows me to analyze in a deeper way than otherwise possible the
major issues that continue to animatemodernChinese political thought
and practice – including the relationship of intellectuals to the masses,
the role of government in social transformation, and the articulation
of political action and authority in a post-dynastic Confucian system.
17 What constitutes “adequate” grounding is, of course, a point of debate, but
this remains as true for the interpretation of canonical Western texts as it does
for interpretation across perceived cultural boundaries. My point is simply that
if we accept the possibility of such historical reconstruction given temporal
distance, we should have no problem accepting the possibility of cultural
reconstruction given spatial distance. I am indebted to Mark Bevir for
clarifying this similarity for me.
18 Chang, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis, 8.
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In this book, I therefore begin – though I do not end – with a set
of theoretical problems articulated by Zhang and his fellow intellec-
tuals in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China, insisting
always that their concerns reach beyond their immediate historical
and cultural contexts even as their and my arguments draw important
resources from them. In other words, I do not wish to contribute to
Western debates by critiquing them from “the outside,” so much as
to sustain an argument from Chinese thought, with implications for
contemporary Chinese as much as Western concerns.
Founding and paradox
Zhang was not the only person in China at the time to realize that
community creation was the first order of business for any successful
reform, but he was among the few to recognize the close relationship
of self-aware communities with specifically political institutions. Polit-
ical education – not only for the largely illiterate Chinese masses but
also for the educated elites who equally lacked any real experience of
governing democratically – was a primary concern of most reformers
in the years following the Qing deposal in 1911. Liang Qichao (1873–
1929), one of the most influential intellectuals and social activists in
modern China, advocated mass education campaigns. Sun Yat-sen
(1866–1925), leader of the revolutionary forces that toppled the Qing
dynasty, demanded political tutelage under party leadership. Yuan
Shikai (1859–1916), elected president of the newly declared Repub-
lic, recommended (and after only a short term in office, attempted to
install) benevolent dictatorship.
Zhang dismissed these proposed solutions as not only elitist, and
therefore threats to both the practice and foundation of democracy,
but also ineffective. After spending the early years of his public career
promoting liberal institutions – like constitutions, parliaments, and
civil liberties – that persistently failed to materialize, Zhang came to
identify the problem of founding as a problem of the right people:
“As I see it, making the political lies in people; those people exist
and the political flourishes” (ZQJ 5). Although here Zhang uses the
word for “persons” (ren) rather than for “the people” in the sense of
masses (min or pingmin), he does not expect elites alone to do this
work – even if, by writing in classical rather than vernacular Chinese,
they were the audience he primarily addressed. To Zhang, political
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regimes meant nothing without the commitment of the people who
both founded and sustained them; as later chapters will demonstrate,
this included people at all levels of society, and of all degrees of talent
(see, e.g., ZQJ 307). A study abroad in England convinced him, in fact,
that these specific, diffuse capacities of everyone in society could be
encouraged by the proper institutions, which he argued did matter to
the kinds of action people can and will take, and to how those actions
affect other members of the political community (ZQJ 430).
With these observations, Zhang pictures the relationship between
persons and laws as circular, but this circularity only underscores the
indeterminacy of beginning: where do these people who can found and
sustain democratic regimes come from? Social-contract theorists, such
as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, often paradoxically hold
that the necessary character traits – civic involvement, participatory
capacity – exist prior to membership in a political community (as in
John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government), or can be instilled by
a benevolent lawgiver (as in Rousseau’s On the Social Contract).19
Recently, however, a variety of democratic theorists – including
Hannah Arendt, William Connolly, Sheldon Wolin, Bonnie Honig,
and Hanna Pitkin – have noted the rich, mutually constitutive rela-
tionship between the individual and the community to remind us that
no demiurgic founder can definitively reshape the face of society or pol-
itics. It is only the political community itself, in a series of incremen-
tal, unpredictable steps, that can noncoercively effect positive social
and political transformation. In this view, neither persons nor laws
are ontologically or historically prior to each other. In Bonnie Honig’s
words, the founding “quandary of chicken-and-egg (which comes first,
good people or good law?) takes off and attaches to democratic politics
more generally.” As she points out,
Every day, after all, new citizens are born, and still others emigrate into
established regimes. Every day, already socialized citizens mistake, depart
from, or simply differ about the commitments of democratic citizenship.
Every day, democracies resocialize, capture, or reinterpellate citizens into
19 More recently, John Rawls, in Political Liberalism, has appealed to Kantian
universal reason to make foundational decisions about the obligations and
goals of political membership before the community is even formed – overtly
displacing the liberal rights and democratic decision-making the polity is
meant to champion.
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their political institutions and culture in ways those citizens do not freely
will, nor could they.20
This process of ongoing, mutual constitution renders founding acts
merely symbolic: no act, however novel, is not already somehow con-
ditioned by the community in which it must take place. A founder
may “remain the subject, the ‘hero,’ of the story,” but he or she is
never “unequivocally . . . the author of its eventual outcome.”21 This
is because it is assumed that the world – any world – into which
a founding act is inserted necessarily comprises an “always-already”
existing community, that executes, interprets, and inflects action taken
to change it.22 Foundings – and political innovation in general – are
better described as interventions that contribute to, but do not master-
fully control, the inauguration of new political movements, ideas, and
conditions.
These readings of founding offer crucial insights into the nature of
action in democratic regimes, explaining that the novelty of founding
is not a characteristic exclusive to it. Broadly diffuse interventions in
everyday political life, by ordinary citizens, inaugurate new lines of
action for the entire community, and for that reason are analogous
in both form and scope to initial, community-establishing acts. But
it is not clear that all founding acts are simply interventions in some
existing set of arrangements – what Hanna Pitkin, following Hannah
Arendt, has called the “always-already” available resources for inaugu-
rating and sustaining action in public.23 Zhang’s dilemma – indeed, the
dilemma of many democratizing societies all over the world – demon-
strates that this assumption is not universally applicable. The China
of Zhang’s time did have some functional social organizations, includ-
ing trade guilds, native-place associations, and secret societies. Yet
Chinese society did not possess a cache of relevant sentiment that was
already available for invocation by the theorist or activist. Zhang’s
question remains: how may individuals and small groups effectively
build a political regime or set of institutions, when that task demands
the coordination of an entire society around a particular set of norms
that are not yet shared, or evenwidely understood?Only inmature self-
ruling polities can political self-sufficiency be endowed by an already
20 Honig, “Between Decision and Deliberation,” 3.
21 Arendt, The Human Condition, 185.
22 Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob, 282. 23 Ibid.
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existing historical acceptance of the regime, and only from the per-
spective of Euro-Atlantic political experience can such a view ever
make sense. Founding on this account loses the paradoxical edge that
made it useful as a model for sustaining action in the first place, and
becomes simply another instance in which Western political theory
solves problems only for itself.
Zhang’s founding narrative turns instead to investigating how the
internal struggle of individuals can be influenced by external environ-
ments without being reduced to them, paying special attention to the
incremental but nevertheless necessary steps that must be taken before
collective action around a shared goal is even possible. In reformulat-
ing the question of founding, Zhang does not assume the imminent
arrival of a benevolent lawgiver, the possibility of spontaneous coales-
cence, or the reality of an already existing community. He asks, rather,
how may individuals act efficaciously and noncoercively, before col-
lective action with others on however minimal a shared goal is likely or
possible? He theorizes multiple steps in this bootstrapping process –
from self-awareness, to local engagement of one’s talents, to inter-
subjective negotiation or “accommodation” – each of which turns on
resonance and exemplariness rather than force or persuasion as its cen-
tral mechanism of change. Part of what makes this approach to social
transformation credible is the very social embeddedness of individu-
als: existing within social and familial (if not political) frameworks,
the work of singular actors can build to dramatic effect simply by
influencing those closest to them. Zhang’s dilemma, however, is pre-
cisely that these already existing relationships do not transparently and
self-evidently translate into the kinds of political practice that make
democratic, constitutional government possible. The chapters that fol-
low explain how Zhang elaborates this vision of founding in terms
of meaningful practice, how he extends the logic of his founding to
apply to acts that sustain as much as inaugurate, and how he reads
interpersonal accommodation of differences as integral to building a
coherent yet internally diverse polity.
Chapter summary
Zhang confronts his task of founding by negotiating a series of para-
doxes: which comes first, people committed to self-rule or the institu-
tions that make self-rule possible? Why was elite-led, top-down reform
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not effective in fostering democratic practice among China’s masses –
and what was the alternative? How can taking political action make
sense as “political” before the communities that could underwrite or
legitimate such action exist? Part I of this book, comprising this chap-
ter and the next, provides the historical and theoretical context that
for Zhang brought these questions to the fore. Chapter 2 delves into
the specific influences and dilemmas that shaped Zhang’s intellectual
trajectory, singling out his extensive work in his political journal The
Tiger for its historical significance as well as it unusual intellectual
heft. In that chapter I also explain why Zhang believed careful atten-
tion to “theory” (lilun) could help to solve the practical dilemmas
China faced. I divide my subsequent discussion of Zhang’s political
theory into two parts that make up the remaining sections of this book.
Part II, “Founding,” explores the key concepts and debates that medi-
ate Zhang’s thoughts on how to establish a self-ruling community.
These chapters construct a conceptual frame through which the spe-
cific practices examined in Part III, “Action,” can be construed as both
political and effective given these founding dilemmas.
Chapter 3, “The founding paradox,” begins Part II. There I show
how Zhang worked to resolve the paradoxes of founding by draw-
ing on a powerful repository of both Chinese and Western resources.
Bringing Rousseau’s Social Contract to bear on the story of political
origins in the neo-Confucian text Doctrine of the Mean, Zhang sug-
gests that an ongoing process of gradually increasing resonance, rather
than a moment of instantaneous consent, offers a more realistic but
equally noncoercive model for political founding. Zhang’s paradoxical
interventions here are largely framed by an ongoing, two-millennia-
old Chinese debate over institution-based (fazhi) versus person-based
(renzhi) reform, which I analyze in detail in Chapter 4, “Rule by man
and rule by law.” Although Zhang is best known – both among his
contemporaries and among modern-day Chinese scholars – for being
an uncompromising advocate of “rule by law,” I argue that he in fact
occupies a more ambivalent position that reflects the nuances of his
founding narrative. In imperial times, “rule by man” indicated a faith
that the virtuousness of the persons in power – the emperor and the
scholar-officials or “literati” (shi) that ran his bureaucracy – deter-
mined the quality of the government. In the tentatively democratic
discourses that circulated in the early Republic, rule by man came to
be identified with mass education campaigns designed to outfit the
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new putative rulers of China – not only the non-officeholding gentry,
but also the largely illiterate peasantry – with virtues appropriate to
their station. For reformers like Liang Qichao and later thinkers of the
radical, modernization-focused May Fourth Movement, rule by man
specifically required action in “social” (shehui) and “cultural” (wen-
hua) spheres and disavowed the efficacy of institutional or “political”
(zhengzhi) reform – the position associated with rule by law.
Zhang in general rejects these rule-by-man interpretations and
upholds rule by law, at least insofar as he affirms the necessity for
political action. His reasons for doing so, however, are less related to
a commitment to certain liberal institutions than they are to a deep
distrust of the top-down transformative power rule-by-man rubrics
authorized, and the stark binary of society versus politics that under-
lay them. Zhang in fact shares with rule-by-man theorists a belief in the
decisive role played by the mental and moral orientations of individu-
als in transforming the socio-political environment, even as he extends
this logic to include institutional as well as moral transformations. This
belief in the efficacious political potency of individuals made Zhang
skeptical of a pure reliance on institutional changes to achieve political
reform, even as it suggested other, noncoercive ways in which a con-
stitutional, self-ruling republic could be brought about. Zhang depicts
“men” (or, better, “persons”) and “laws” as complementary compo-
nents of republic-building; his “political talk” (zhengtan) simply points
out that judicious reliance on institutions offers a path for change that
need not presuppose values that are already present on a wide scale.
As a noncoercive model for social change, however, Zhang’s recon-
structed rule-by-man position commits him to explaining how such
personal and community-wide transformations can take place without
resort to top-down imposition. If the outcome is to be more spon-
taneous and ground-up than shaped by external controls, how can
differences of opinion, outlook, and background be effectively legiti-
mated? How can the conflicts between differently oriented individuals
be adjudicated in a way that will construct, rather than subvert, the
cohesiveness of a political community? To his audience trained in the
Confucian tradition, Zhang must also explain how and in what ways
the morality of an act is related to its efficacy. Can “virtue” admit
of plural but equally resonant interpretations, and if so, what are the
implications for politics of these plural notions of the good? If Zhang
means to place the capacity for political action within reach of every
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citizen, contemporary understandings of political action and political
actors would have to change.
That change specifically involves how – and in what realms – those
actors identify themselves and their actions as “political.” In Chap-
ter 5, “Public, private, and the political,” I point out that Zhang’s
unusual combination of individuals acting in diverse, politically sig-
nificant ways challenges a key distinction that for a diverse range of
political theories maintains the integrity of the “political realm”: the
public-private binary. I argue that Zhang’s notion of “political,” rather
than ascribing political meaning to an act on the basis of where or with
whom it is performed, is better understood as a deliberate intervention
in a shared fate, or, differently stated, as an attempt to shape social
circumstances (shi) and environments (jing) that are not automatically
self-regulating. Comparing his work to a wide variety of theorists of
public action, including Hannah Arendt and Sheldon Wolin, as well as
his own contemporary, Liang Qichao, I show that Zhang shares their
basic understanding of and goals for political action. He disagrees with
them, however, about the need – or availability – of collective action
to constitute it. It is in fact precisely because individual actions com-
prise necessary everyday elements of an emergent, shared life that they
play such formative roles, even if they can never decisively shape the
community in one direction rather than another. By drawing attention
to the incremental and everyday processes of polity-building in places
of all kinds, Zhang alerts us to further locations for political action
that the categories of public and private obscure, and to the activities
they categorically constrain by deeming them too limited in effect.
Part III of this book, “Action,” details those specific political prac-
tices Zhang believes will motivate this emergent, sustainable polity.
The first and most foundational of those practices is what Zhang
calls “self-awareness” or zijue, the eponymous topic of Chapter 6. By
“self-awareness,” Zhangmeans the realization by individuals that their
actions andmental orientations can constitute the foundation for wider
socio-political change. Combined with Zhang’s reconstructed rule-by-
man position, self-awareness does not elide intersubjective elements or
impositions of political forms, but it does frame political action in a
way that is not always concerned to build majorities or gather allies
to one’s cause. I defend this model of singular personal orientation
against the argument – made most explicitly by Hanna Pitkin, and
indirectly by Liang Qichao – that only action in concert can reflect
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the common purpose required for non-tyrannical, legitimate change
to shared environments. Drawing attention to the strong resemblances
between Zhang’s idea of self-awareness and the practices of moral
and political mediation that constituted political authority under the
Chinese empire, I argue that Zhang pictures the individual citizen as a
pivot around which turn the materially efficacious power his internal
moral effort partly calls into being (that of the polity acting together)
and the moral legitimacy of democratic rule. Where Pitkin demands
that such self-aware “theorists” become democratic actors by joining
together in common purpose with others, Zhang urges those actors
who have always had a significant but unrecognized impact on Chinese
political life – farmers, rebels, merchants, women – to become “theo-
rists” by assuming their position at the crux of this fraught triangle of
legitimation.
The first step in taking political action for Zhang, then, consists not
in bridging the gaps between oneself and others for the purposes of
concerted action, but in overcoming the disparity between the world
one envisions internally and the reality one faces externally. This kind
of awareness of the self may be needed precisely when politics itself
has failed – that is, has failed not in terms of accomplishing some
objective, but failed absolutely – though this does not discount its
political characteristics. Self-awareness is the first of Zhang’s explicit
strategies to reorient the focus of political activity away from “action
in concert” toward disparate – though cumulative – efforts to render
shared problems incrementally and personally tractable, in ways that
complement or supplant deliberately coordinated public control.
The internal retooling that begins with self-awareness takes concrete
shape in the “self-use of talent” (ziyong cai), the subject of Chapter 7,
and extends farther outward to include intersubjective understanding
and mutual interpretation with the “accommodation” (tiaohe) of dif-
ference, which I discuss in Chapter 8. Identifying the “foundation”
(ben) of specifically democratic government in the self-use of talent,
Zhang overtly repudiates traditional forms of governance in which the
imperial center exercised political control through the management
and training of personnel. Whereas “virtue” (de), the term more com-
monly a focus of Chinese political reform, has been historically linked
to a discernible and unitary idea of the good, talent manifest outside
imperially sanctioned outlets had long been associated with subversive
cunning – especially on the part of females. The self-use of talent, then,
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unmoors talent from the virtues that normalized its deployment, trans-
forming talent into an emblem of unpredictability and nonconformity.
Like self-awareness, the self-use of talent signals Zhang’s innovative
refurbishment of imperial modes of rule for democratic purposes.
The decisions required to “use one’s talent” do not involve negoti-
ating the choices of others, but overcoming the tension generated by
one’s inner moral directive, on the one hand, and the external con-
ditions and oppositions (including legal and political regimes and the
actions, desires, and demands of other people) that hinder, shape, or
encourage it, on the other. In concrete terms, Zhang’s advocacy of the
self-use of talent indicated his support for the local political assemblies
that nurtured hope for an incipient federalism in early Republican
China. Such assemblies were primary outlets for the unstructured tal-
ent of merchants, local gentry, and other agents whose lack of an exam
degree systematically excluded them from political participation and
decision-making under the empire. On institutional and conceptual
levels, talent signifies the always destabilizing potential of democratic
action.
These local transformations of both institutions and attitudes are
complemented by Zhang’s well-known doctrine of appreciation of
difference, which I examine in Chapter 8, “Accommodation.” Like the
mental preparation that enables one to self-use talent, accommodation
of differences involves a rigorous internal reorientation, yet derives its
definitive character and purpose from the changes it inspires in the
external world. Where the use of talent acted upon and within local
environments, accommodation acts to foster particular relationships
between persons, acknowledging the political world as comprising
interconnected but differently motivated agents. These “differences”
in Zhang’s work find personal expression as idiosyncrasy, and political
expression as dissent.
Idiosyncrasy recognizes difference across persons as not only
inevitable, but also invigorating for political association. For Zhang,
this kind of difference names a productive gap between individuals
that need not provoke hostility; as opposed to “sameness,” difference
invites interpretation and engagement that may go far toward explain-
ing how a shared vision of community may be possible among dis-
parate, self-aware individuals. The acceptance of manifold difference
facilitates (though, it is worth noting, does not guarantee) the inter-
pretive acts that render any particular exemplary action – like those
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of Zhang’s founders – meaningful and effective in a political commu-
nity. As such, the process of recognition and accommodation incited
by an instance of difference is more definitively other-oriented than
are self-awareness or the self-use of talent, inviting a closer look at the
implications of accommodation for the political arenas and discourses
Zhang was trying to construct.
Zhang characterizes dissent, the second meaning of difference, as
motivating an interplay of forces, ideas, or interests that sharpens the
commitment of its participants without fostering mutual exclusivity.
Drawing heavily on the work of British liberals Walter Bagehot and
John Morley, Zhang insists that spirits of dissent and compromise can
both play roles in China’s political advancement, as they did in Britain
(ZQJ 254). At the same time, it is also one of its preconditions. As
Zhang points out, citing Bagehot’s lack of appreciation for the habits of
the British that make their government successful, “Only once a nation
allows dissenting opinions to flourish, can it have cabinet government”
(ZQJ 9). China must not only have a parliamentary system, but a range
of opinions to express in it. Accommodation is part of this imported
framework, yet at the same time remains uniquely capable of resolving
the problems of difference and disagreement that arise as China transi-
tions, peacefully and incrementally, to democratic rule. In contrast to
Western agonists and difference democrats, however, Zhang charac-
terizes public commonality as multiple accommodations incrementally
negotiated within interpersonal relationships, rather than the a priori
space that forms the basis for resistance to imposed authority. Zhang
thus draws attention to how even public discussions do violence to
difference by assuming a willing and pre-formed public to govern the
terms of political action.
The tension between “inner” cultivation and “outer” world-
ordering that runs throughout Zhang’s thought helps him to draw
attention to the wide range of transformative individual actions that
are taken neither in deliberate concert with others nor completely inde-
pendently of them. In the concluding chapter of the book, I suggest
how this inner–outer axis culminates in a model of political action that
can contribute both to the historiography of Republican thought and
to modern-dayWestern discussions of political agency. Zhang’s model
challenges contemporary perceptions of the political as an exclusively
collective and public endeavor, by focusing instead on how internal
states result in, even as they are shaped by, external transformation.
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He therefore urges a reconsideration of how individual moral effort
can be rendered meaningful and effective politically, even as that effort
remains embedded within circumstances and institutions beyond the
capacity of any one individual to control.
Zhang’s “democracy”
All of these practices build toward the self-constitution of a republican
regime (gonghe zhengti), which to Zhang bears close resemblance to
the British liberalism he observed during his studies in England: office-
holders are beholden for their power and legitimacy to those they
govern, that is, the polity or guoti; the legal regime, whether embodied
in a written constitution or not, binds both government and governed
alike; a federal structure assures self-ruling opportunities for tradition-
ally autonomous locales; and the populace is guaranteed the protection
of certain rights such as habeas corpus, free expression, and (to a lim-
ited degree) political participation.24 He expects this new order to come
about, however, largely by means of action constituted by purely per-
sonal, internal transformations – an approach many have associated
with neo-Confucian self-cultivation. Why, then, do I classify Zhang’s
political theory as a “democratic” and not a liberal, republican, or
Confucian one?
In general, liberal and republican theories see particular definitions
of liberty as central to their arguments for the best form of government.
Although both camps disagree among and between themselves about
the exact definition of liberty, most agree that political institutions –
including those Zhang advocated – are defensible to the extent that
they promote or secure liberty.25 But Zhang’s insistence on these self-
constituting practices suggests that he saw little at stake with liberty
alone – a word that almost nowhere appears in the work I examine
24 Many historians identify liberal currents in China with the “Anglo-American”
variety, but differences between British and American forms of liberalism, as
well as their multinational influences from French and German thought, were
clear to Zhang and other Republican thinkers. For example, Zhang explicitly
defended British parliamentarism against the American-style presidential
system promoted by Sun Yat-sen (ZQJ 104–127).
25 The paradigmatic examples here are Rawls, Political Liberalism, and Pettit,
Republicanism.
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here. Zhang’s more salient concern is promoting citizen involvement
in polity-building, given the absence of even minimal consensus, stable
political signs, and social cohesion in the nascent Chinese Republic.
These are primarily problems of founding, and they implicate himmore
closely in democratic discourses about the nature and sites of political
action than in liberal or republican discourses about the promotion
of liberty. Although he knows his cause could surely be served by
the exercise of certain liberties and the protection of an established
constitution, he could not assume the security of either. His question
was precisely how political communities with particular values and
capacities, including the valuing and protection of particular forms of
liberty, can come into being, and what role individual citizens play in
that formation.
Some commentators have denied the importance of “democratic”
discourse to early Republican Chinese thought, pointing out that the
term hardly ever appears in texts from that time.26 However, as histo-
rians like Xu Zongmian have pointed out, the concept of democracy
was implicit in many early Republican debates as reformers articulated
alternatives to “state power” (guoquan) by using the concept of “the
people’s power” (minquan). State power was explicitly formulated to
counter the democratic tyranny and factional chaos many believed
would result from giving the people power.27 Zhang’s vision of a self-
constituting republican government is, moreover, unusually egalitarian
even among advocates of people’s power, in that it does not privilege
elites as the sole source of social change or political leadership. He
elaborates instead a more accessible set of practices designed to har-
ness, cultivate and regulate diverse sites of power diffused throughout
society. In my view, “democracy” captures better than other terms
these plural instincts about political action. Whether that democracy
be deliberative, aggregative, or even liberal, one of its defining charac-
teristics is recognition of a mass of actors with valid claims to partici-
pate in political processes, however defined. To Zhang, self-awareness,
the self-use of talent, and the accommodation of differences can and
should be undertaken by all individual citizens, to craft not only the
contours of their own citizenship, but the polity itself. In this endeavor,
26 Jin and Liu, “From ‘Republicanism’ to ‘Democracy.’”
27 Xu, “Shibaizhe de tansuo,” 23–25.
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the “supreme political value is . . . dispersed power” – a notion at least
one political theorist has seen as definitive of democracy.28
Zhang’s Tiger essays were therefore preoccupied with the attempt
to bring ever greater numbers of nonelites into political life. It is worth
noting, however, that this broad participatory impulse, and the space
it furnished for political critique, was not an entirely novel West-
ern import. These political possibilities in the early Republic reflected
the influence of neo-Confucianism (lixue), a rich and diverse body of
thought that constituted late imperial orthodoxy even as it provided
resources for critiquing the imperial order. Officially, lixue texts –
namely Zhu Xi’s (1130–1200) authoritative compilation of and com-
mentary on the “Fourteen Books,” a set of canonical texts that included
works closely associated with Confucius and his followers – served
as the basis for state-administered civil exams. Because the exams
determined entry into government service, Zhu Xi’s texts were inti-
mately familiar to all literate men in China, even if many late impe-
rial intellectual trends differed from or directly rejected the methods
and assumptions of this neo-Confucian orthodoxy. At the time of
Zhang’s birth and early education, for example, “empirical research”
(kaozheng) scholarship dominated the Chinese intellectual world, pro-
moting philological rather than what was, in the view of its advo-
cates, an overly subjective, philosophical inquiry into canonical texts.29
Kaozheng ideas played major roles in reform ideology of the late nine-
teenth century, most famously the attempt by Kang Youwei (1858–
1927) to idealize Confucius as an advocate of radical institutional
reform.30
However, Zhang’s biographer notes that in Zhang’s native Hunan
province, neo-Confucian lixue remained the dominant intellectual
force until the exams were abolished in 1905.31 Zhang’s own attempt
to locate these sources of authority and political interpretation in
China’s new citizens, and not only their intellectual leaders, reflects
the neo-Confucian faith that the Confucian Way (dao) heralded values
everyone could potentially share. Contrary to much popular opin-
ion, Cheng Yi (1033–1107), Zhu Xi and later imperial neo-Confucian
28 Wolin, “The Liberal/Democratic Divide,” 98.
29 The classic study of this transition is Elman, From Philosophy to Philology.
30 Kang, Kongzi gai zhi kao. 31 Zou, Zhang Shizhao zhuan, 7–8.
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thinkers were not bent on sustaining what Europeans called an “Ori-
ental despotism” by centralizing absolutist authority; but nor did they
irresponsibly ignore the work of governing, as their kaozheng critics
would later contend. In the words of historian Peter Bol, these neo-
Confucians crafted a political theory that destabilized the authority of
the central ruler by treating “successful government as dependent on
a process of personal and social transformation that could be adopted
by all people.”32
ThomasMetzger, Chang Hao, and other historians have shown that
lixue’s emphasis on the personal interpretation of Confucian classic
texts authorized a deeply fraught mode of political contestation under
the late empire, in which scholars could leverage their own interpreta-
tion of moral and political authority to censure the rulers in power.33
Although never officially sanctioned or institutionally implemented,
this tradition of moral censure influenced the articulation of political
relationships by Chinese elites well into the early Republic and beyond.
Zhang’s theory can be seen in some ways as extending this form of
neo-Confucianism, which historically devolved power away from the
ruler toward an independent moral authority – the daotong, or “suc-
cession of the Way” – lodged in scholars and their ancient learning.34
Analogously, Zhang attempts to devolve power away from the intel-
lectuals who had assumed the mantle of leadership after the fall of the
dynasty, toward the new citizens of China’s Republic.
Although Zhang’s move retains the form of neo-Confucian politi-
cal theory, in that he sees personal effort acting independently of the
government apparatus as the pivot of wider socio-political order, he
must ensure that traditionally unsanctioned actors can be registered as
politically legitimate without conforming to the unitary and sometimes
mystical moral order neo-Confucianism assumed. This required Zhang
to rethink the substantive foundation of politics, marking his major
break with the “epistemological optimism” that some have argued
motivates the Confucian moralization of social and political life.35
Part of what so rankled Zhang about the Chinese imperial system,
32 Bol, Neo-Confucianism in History, 116.
33 Metzger, Escape from Predicament; Chang, You’an yishi.
34 Metzger, Escape from Predicament, 132; c.f. de Bary, Neo-Confucian
Orthodoxy, 27–38.
35 Metzger, A Cloud across the Pacific, 21–31; Chang, You’an yishi, 3–32.
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and about those who continued to think within its categories, was its
conflation of ethical virtue with the capacity to effect political good –
a logical fallacy that he explicitly blames on Confucianism (ZQJ 181).
Moral goodness does not always result in political efficacy, Zhang
realizes, and being “selfless” in the way many contemporary political
leaders recommended often resulted in sacrificing oneself not for the
greater good but for the power plays of political elites. He saw his
own work as an important corrective to particular Confucian tenets
embodied in the institutional apparatus of the late empire, particularly
those which in his view conflated loyalty to the emperor with loyalty
to the Chinese political community as a whole, and those that effec-
tively invalidated both the agency and the contributions of the com-
mon people. At that time and place, such a position required Zhang
to conceptually refute the still widespread Confucian notion of min-
ben, or “the people as root,” and replace it with a compelling the-
ory of minzhu, or “the people ruling,” the term by which democracy
eventually came to be known in Chinese.36
Zhang does so by emphasizing the legitimacy of an enlightened self-
interest, developing concepts such as “talent” and “self-awareness”
that bear strong resemblances to late imperial critiques of the “public
good”made byHuang Zongxi (1610–1695), Gu Yanwu (1613–1682),
Dai Zhen (1724–1777), and others. More importantly, these concepts
theorize an outlet for traditionally unsanctioned sectors of society, such
as merchants and peasants, to make their mark on politics and work
against the grain of established authority. Much of Zhang’s work in
The Tiger, in fact, is dedicated to explaining what it means, in Zhang’s
words, “to have a self” (you wo) – implying that such inner-directed
self-reflexivity constitutes an important starting point for thinking and
acting politically, for everyone. As a theorist of the so-called “New
Culture Movement” that arose after the revolution of 1911, Zhang
heralds the growing trend to transform Chinese political culture into
36 Minzhu, like many other terms of Euro-American political, literary, and
scientific discourse, was borrowed by Japanese scholars from classical Chinese
and then jaggedly reimported back into Chinese linguistic communities. Jin
and Liu (“From ‘Republicanism’ to ‘Democracy,’” 473) document four
meanings for minzhu in China at this time: the emperor, which was the
original and earliest meaning of the term in classical Chinese; a popularly
elected ruler; a political system opposed in any way to hereditary monarchy;
and finally, rule by the people.
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one more amenable to individual expression and liberation – returning
us to the liberal elements that some commentators assume define his
work. From this perspective, Zhang ultimately takes important issue
with both neo-Confucianism and democracy. Adherents of the former,
for the most part, historically denied the agency of nonelites, who were
seen as the beneficiaries rather than the actors of politics; and adherents
of the latter usually read the capacity to take free action in concert with
others as definitive.
In short, Zhang’s democratic/neo-Confucian/liberal account of
political action amounts to muchmore than any of those things consid-
ered separately: Zhang’s political theory is informed by contemporary
British liberal values, conditioned by the new attempt at republican
rule in China, and yet deeply indebted to notions of political agency
and institutional structure that developed under China’s late imperial
government. Whatever Zhang’s own professions of ideological influ-
ence, the tensions among these three disparate political visions help us
locate Zhang’s unique political stance. Despite, or perhaps because of,
his belief that the capacity for founding acts was diffused throughout
society rather than concentrated in one or a few elite hands, Zhang’s
approach to politics does not turn on a belief that such action must
always be collective action. This individualized approach to political
intervention may be one reason why, despite his faith in broad, varied
participation at all levels of society, he rarely invokes such terms as
“commoners” or “masses” (pifu, pingmin) as political actors.37 For
Zhang, min (the people) possess ruling authority, but political actors
are almost always referred to simply as “persons” (ren) – implying
by turns that anybody, if not always everyone, can participate suc-
cessfully in changing shared environments. Zhang’s syncretic theory
ultimately signals the possibility that some forms of Confucianism can
accommodate egalitarian impulses, some forms of liberalism can be
focused on personal effort as much as on institutions, and some forms
of democracy can harbor individualistic strains.
In what follows, however, I refer to Zhang’s efforts as “democratic,”
or alternatively as linked to “self-rule,” because I see his defining
37 One notable exception is in his essay “The State and Responsibility,” discussed
more fully in Chapter 5, where Zhang states, “the responsibility for protecting
the state cannot but extend all the way down to the commoners [pifu]” (ZQJ
127–8).
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dilemma in the years following 1911 until the May Fourth Move-
ment of 1919 as the attempt to theorize individual members (ren)
of the people (min) as rulers. Although democratic collective action
suggests that “global” processes often remain beyond the reach of
one individual, the neo-Confucian model Zhang develops reminds us
that local environments are almost always tractable in some degree to
individual control, and that these local transformations can have some-
times spectacular effects on the wider environment. By acting on local
events, people, and environments; revising their inner visions; work-
ing through their inner struggles; confronting the demands, feelings,
and talents of others; and, most importantly, convincing themselves
that their actions, however incremental and small, matter to wider
outcomes, individuals can harness their own uncertain power before –
and sometimes as a prerequisite to – joining together with others. In
the next chapter, I give a fuller picture of the historical background
against which this theory of action played out.
